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Abstract—Knowledge of the location of vehicles and tracking
of the routes they follow are a requirement for a number of
applications. However, public disclosure of the identity and
position of drivers jeopardizes user privacy, and securing
the tracking through asymmetric cryptography may have an
exceedingly high computational cost. In this paper, we address
all of the issues above by introducing A-VIP, a lightweight
privacy-preserving framework for tracking of vehicles. A-VIP
leverages anonymous position beacons from vehicles, and the
cooperation of nearby cars collecting and reporting the beacons
they hear. Such information allows an authority to verify the
locations announced by vehicles, or to infer the actual ones if
needed. We assess the effectiveness of A-VIP through testbed
implementation results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Borrowing from a well-established communication pattern
in wireless LANs, vehicular networks have adopted the term
beaconing to indicate the periodic broadcasting of messages
to neighboring vehicles or road-side units (RSUs). These
messages, defined in both the SAE J2735 [1] and the ETSI
ITS [2] specifications, carry vehicle identifier, timestamp and
location information, and may be used for safety purposes
as well as for cooperative awareness.
In a number of scenarios, location accountability is a
requirement in order to provide services to the community
or to drivers. Therefore, beacons used for vehicle position
identification and tracking in such contexts need to be made
secure. For instance, secure reporting of vehicle location can
substantiate drivers’ claims in case of accidents. At the same
time, secure location verification by authorities can provide
non-repudiation and liability for those involved.
The information carried by beacons may be secured
through the use of an on-board tamper-proof Hardware
Security Module (HSM) as well as signatures, cryptography
and certificates [3]. However, these solutions suffer from
three major drawbacks, concerning (i) users’ privacy, (ii)
computational costs of security and (iii) the system trust on
user correctness. As for the first aspect, when not strictly
required, public disclosure of the vehicle identity to all
receiving devices in the proximity of a beaconer is an issue:
vehicles can be tracked by adversaries, jeopardizing drivers’
privacy and requiring complex pseudonym management [4].
There is thus a need for separating secure position identi-
fication by authorities and by peer users in the vehicular
network, the latter representing an undesirable feature from
a user privacy viewpoint. As for the second aspect, security
mechanisms induce significant protocol overhead and com-
putational complexity, up to the point where their use should
be largely dependent on applications and circumstances [5].
Finally, basic solutions cannot guarantee the correctness of
the location information provided by a user who owns the
required cryptographic material, but has a malfunctioning
GPS receiver or is capable of tampering with GPS data
before they are input to the HSM.
In this paper, we address the issues above by proposing A-
VIP (Anonymous Verification and Inference of Positions), a
framework that, unlike previous work, (i) allows an authority
to securely verify the positions claimed by vehicles without
resorting to asymmetric cryptography – as is done instead in
the current IEEE 1609.2 standard [6]; (ii) safeguards drivers’
privacy with respect to other vehicles participating in the
network; (iii) does not require uninterrupted radio coverage
from a roadside unit (RSU) communication infrastructure.
Furthermore, in presence of unverified location claims, A-
VIP allows the authority to infer the actual position of
malfunctioning or misbehaving vehicles.
To that end, A-VIP leverages a simple, yet effective,
mechanism based on anonymous position beacons broad-
casted by vehicles, which prevent overhearing nodes from
identifying or tracking their source.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the system scenario and communication protocol in Sec. II.
Sec. III details the location verification and inference proce-
dures, while Sec. IV discusses the resilience of A-VIP to a
number of attacks by adversarial vehicles. The performance
of A-VIP in a real-road environment is evaluated in Sec. V.
Finally, Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. ANONYMOUS POSITIONING PROCEDURE
We consider a vehicular network composed of vehicles
communicating with each other and, occasionally, with
roadside units (RSUs). Vehicles may have also a 3G/LTE
radio interface, through which they can access the cellular
network that fully covers the road topology. Both RSUs and
cellular base stations allow vehicles to contact a well-known
Location Authority (LA).
Vehicles are equipped with GPS, thus, unless otherwise
specified, they know their own position and share a common
time reference. Each vehicle owns cryptographic material,
i.e., a certified identity, and a long-term secret key, that can
be used to establish a secure channel with the LA at any
time, through either an RSU or the cellular infrastructure.
Vehicles that comply with the A-VIP mechanism are
defined as correct, while the others may be: (i) faulty, that
is, they follow the protocol but provide incorrect information
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Fig. 1. Overview of A-VIP procedures by the beaconer, reporter and LA.
due to, e.g., GPS malfunctioning, or (ii) adversarial, i.e.,
their aim is to announce a fake position and have it verified,
either to discredit nearby users, or to disrupt the A-VIP
operation. To that end, adversarial nodes can either devi-
ate from the A-VIP communication protocol procedure or
comply with it, but injecting false information. In this work,
we consider internal, independent adversaries, as colluding
attacks are largely impractical in our vehicular scenario.
A. A-VIP goals
A-VIP aims at allowing an authority to (i) track vehicles,
by verifying the positions they announce while guaranteeing
their privacy with respect to other vehicles, and (ii) detect
faulty or adversarial nodes and infer their actual locations.
Such goals are achieved with low computational complexity.
B. Communication procedures
The procedures in the A-VIP protocol are described
below, while a schematic overview is shown in Fig. 1.
Registration. The registration procedure takes place every
time a vehicle is started, and is repeated after a registration
validity time has expired. It is performed over the secure
channel between the vehicle and the LA, established with
the long-term key via the RSU infrastructure, if available,
or through 3G/LTE, otherwise.
Let us assume that a generic vehicle vi sends a registration
request at time instant ti,0. The LA records such an instant
and returns to the vehicle a registration triplet (Ki, ri, oi)
where Ki is a short-term 128-bit AES symmetric key, and
ri, oi are random integers. The triplet is used to compute
a time-dependent secret i(t), shared between the vehicle
and the LA. As detailed later, when sent by vi to the LA,
i(t) allows the LA to verify the freshness of a beacon
transmission and the identity of its originator. In order to
compute it, the two entities initialize a counter to ri and
increment it by oi every τb seconds, e.g., at every beacon
transmission. The updated counter is then encrypted with
Ki using AES in counter mode [7] (AES-CTR). Thus, in
general, if ti,0 + nτb ≤ t < ti,0 + (n + 1)τb, then i(t) =
EKi{ri+noi} =
n
i . Note that both ri and oi can be picked
at random since the chances of collision among n values,
related to different vehicles at the same time, are negligible.
The LA is then in a position to precompute all the
upcoming values of ni for a period that depends on the
registration validity time.
Anonymous beaconing. When travelling, all correct vehi-
cles broadcast a beacon every τb, as foreseen by current
standards1. Also, beacon transmissions occur at a power
level common to all correct vehicles and at the basic data
rate. We assume the beacon to be split into two parts:
an encrypted one, for the purposes set forth in this paper
and an unencrypted one, where plaintext content can be
broadcast for such purposes as collision avoidance or co-
operative applications. We assume however that the beacon
is anonymous. When not transmitting, the vehicle listens to
the channel, overhearing beacons broadcasted from other
vehicles and collecting the information therein for later
reporting to the LA.
The beacon content is assembled using the triplet assigned
to a vehicle during the registration. Specifically, the n-
th beacon issued by a vehicle vi carries two pieces of
information, as shown in the “Beaconer” box of Fig. 1:
• the time-dependent secret ni , which can be computed
by vi and by the LA, independently of each other;
• the encrypted current location announced by the vehicle
n
i = EKi{( l
n
i || z
n−1
i )⊕ (ri + noi)}, computed using
the short-term pairwise key Ki from the triplet. The
plaintext location lni is concatenated with the one-bit
flag zn−1i used to notify the LA whether the beacon
issued at step n− 1 was affected by a replay attack (as
explained in Sec. IV). Such a string is then XOR’ed
with the plaintext counter value (ri + noi), to ensure
freshness of the beacon positioning content and thwart
partial-replay attacks (as also detailed in Sec. IV).
Reporting. When a beacon issued by a vehicle vi is correctly
received by a vehicle vj , the latter is required to store the
following entry in a report table, such as the one depicted
in the “Reporter” box of Fig. 1:
• the time tji at which the beacon is received;
• its own position lji at the time the beacon was received;
• the secret ni carried in the beacon;
• the encrypted position ni of vi carried in the beacon;
• a field Qnji, indicating the received signal quality (e.g.,
the received signal power computed by the radio inter-
face driver).
Every τr seconds (report interval), vj generates a report mes-
sage including the report table, populated with data collected
from all newly overheard beacons. The report is transmitted
to the LA, via the RSU or via the cellular network, ensuring
authentication and integrity through standard procedures.
1We acknowledge that there have been proposals to suppress beacons so
as to reduce the channel contention [8]. We stress that our approach can
easily keep that into account, by updating n at each τb, no matter whether
a beacon is transmitted or not.
3III. POSITION VERIFICATION AND INFERENCE
When the LA receives reports from vehicles, it processes
them so as to (i) determine the locations announced by cars
in the system, (ii) verify such locations and (iii) infer the
actual positions of vehicles deemed to have advertised an
incorrect location.
Let the LA divide the road topology into discretized
spatial tiles, whose set is denoted by S. Also, let V be the
set of vehicles that the LA has to verify. Upon receiving a
report message from vehicle vj ∈ V , the LA processes one
report table entry at a time, as follows:
• it extracts the time tji at which vj received the beacon;
• for each vk ∈ V , it computes n such that tk,0 + nτb ≤
tji < tk,0+(n+1)τb, i.e., n = %(tji− tk,0)/τb&, and it
looks up the precomputed secret value nk that matches
the ni in the report table entry (LA box in Fig. 1).
When a match is found, the LA identifies vi as the vehicle
that sent the beacon and retrieves the triplet associated to it.
Then, the LA can take the following actions:
• it decrypts the location ni announced by vi in the
beacon reported by vj ;
• it checks zn−1i ; if the bit is set, it discards the entry;
• else, if zn−1i is unset, it stores n, the position lni
included in the beacon by vi, and the position lnj
announced by vj in the report table entry. The LA also
stores the signal quality indicator,Qnji, that vj measured
on the beacon received from vi.
The LA leverages the information extracted from the
report table entry to identify the possible tiles corresponding
to a vehicle position. For the sake of clarity, in the remainder
of this section we drop the time notation, thus assuming that
all measures refer to the same beacon broadcast interval n.
We now briefly outline the approach adopted by the LA
to identify the tiles corresponding to the position of the
beaconer vi, leveraging the signal quality Qji value of a
beacon reception. For such an approach to be viable, the
LA needs a model of the propagation conditions in the area
where the broadcast transmission took place. Deterministic
(e.g., ray-tracing), stochastic, or measurement-based models
can be used to that end: the A-VIP procedure does not
change and is performed as follows.
Let the propagation model be a function h(s, t, Qji) :
S2 × R → [0, 1] that, for any pair of tiles (s, t) and any
value of Qji, provides the probability P(R(j)t |B(i)s , Qji) that
a beacon sent by vi from tile s can be received by vj located
in tile t, with the quality level Qji reported by vj .
By applying Bayes’ theorem, the LA can use such values
to compute the probability P(B(i)s |R(j)t , Qji) that the bea-
coner was in title s, given that the beacon was heard by vj
in tile t, with a quality level Qji. Specifically,
p(j)i,s = P(B
(i)
s |R
(j)
t , Qji)
=
P(R(j)t |B
(i)
s , Qji) · P(B
(i)
s )
∑
u∈S P(R
(j)
t |B
(i)
u , Qji) · P(B
(i)
u )
(1)
where P(B(i)x ), x = s, u, is the probability that the broad-
casting vehicle vi is in tile x at the moment of the trans-
mission. This value depends on the vehicle density and the
size of the considered area. For simplicity, we can assume
P(B(i)s ) = 1/|S| for any vi and any tile in s ∈ S.
Upon receiving multiple reports, the LA can combine the
above probabilities and compute the probability P (n)i,s that
vi was in s while sending the n-th beacon, based upon the
reports:
P (n)i,s =
∏
j:vj∈Ri
p(j)i,s
∑
u∈S
∏
j:vj∈Ri
p(j)i,u
∀s ∈ S , (2)
where Ri is the set of vehicles that reported vi’s beacon.
An example is portrayed in Fig. 2, where two reporters, vk
and vj , include different quality levels for a beacon received
from vi. For simplicity, in the figure we considered that
the area corresponding to the value of Q, indicated by a
reporter, maps onto an annulus comprised in its reception
range. Then, the set of possible locations of the beaconer is
the intersection of the two annuluses, shaded in Fig. 2(b).
vi
vj
vk
(a)
vi
vj
vk
(b)
Fig. 2. The beacon broadcasted by vi is reported by vk and vj . The
shadowed area in (a) represents vi’s transmission range. The annuluses
denote the set of locations from which a beacon could be received by,
respectively, vk and vj with the quality level indicated in their report. In
(b), the intersection of the annuluses represents the possible positions of vi.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we discuss some possible attacks targeted at dis-
rupting the position verification process described above.
Transmit-power attack. An attacker may maliciously in-
crease or decrease its transmit power, thus affecting the Q-
unaware and Q-aware approaches to the position verification
and pretending to be closer or farther from the reporters than
it actually is. However, while fooling a part of its neighbors,
the attacker cannot help but appear inconsistent to the rest,
since its announced position does not match the physical
behavior of the transmission.
Replay attack. Such an attack has adversarial users replay-
ing beacons from correct vehicles. Although the attacker can
retransmit a copy of the beacon, it cannot tamper with its
content, as both the secret ni and the beaconer position
information are encrypted. We remark that encrypting the
location together with the current counter value, as described
in Sec. II-B, univocally ties it to ni . This prevents partial
replay attacks, where the adversary only replays ni and
modifies the position information ni .
4Still, by performing a full replay at locations other than
those of the original broadcast, the attacker could induce the
LA to tag correct nodes as faulty. In such cases, the timing
of the replay is of the essence:
• in case of a replay attack occurring more than τb
seconds after the legitimate beacon was broadcast, the
LA will no longer be able to match the secret in the
beacon with any precomputed secret during that time
frame, and the report table entry will be ignored;
• in case of a replay attack occurring less than τb seconds
after the legitimate beacon was broadcast and reported
multiple times by one or more witnesses, the LA will
detect the duplicate entry and reject it.
In the latter case, the original beacon sender can detect
the replay of its own beacon and report the misdeed by
setting the zn−1i bit in its following beacon, as introduced in
Sec. II-B. Recall that zn−1i can only be set by the original
beacon sender, since it is encrypted along with the vehicle
position and its freshness is ensured by the counter value.
The LA will thus know that the beacon is invalid without
affecting the vehicle credibility. The only result an attacker
can achieve is thus to occasionally invalidate beacons from
random vehicles. Jamming could yield the same effect with
lower system complexity.
Wormhole attack. The replay attack can be combined with
a wormhole attack, so that a full replay occurs less than τb
seconds after the legitimate beacon was broadcast and in a
different region (to avoid detection by the original sender).
As a result, the replayed beacon will also be reported by
witnesses other than the legitimate one. In this case, it is
up to the LA to detect the inconsistency, by noting that the
same beacon is heard by multiple witnesses farther apart than
the nominal transmission range. The LA will thus be able
to disregard both the original and replayed beacon entries.
Additionally, the presence of a wormhole may be inferred,
with the wormhole ends placed within the communication
range of the reporting witness positions.
Phantom attack. An adversarial vehicle can run a phantom
attack by never broadcasting beacons, nor reporting to the
LA: such a vehicle would thus be completely transparent to
the system. The advantages of such an adversarial strategy
are however dubious. On the one hand, the attack could
be used by a vehicle who is trying to escape liability after
causing a car wreck. On the other, a phantom attacker who
is falsely accused of being involved in an accident, would
be unable to prove it was elsewhere.
Additionally, if the application is used for commercial
purposes, such as to enforce e-toll, phantom attacks could
pose a threat to the system. In such cases, the onboard
devices are required to be tamper-resistant HSMs integrating
the antenna apparatus, so that no vehicle can successfully
disappear from the network.
Teleport attack. An adversarial user could impair local
transmissions of its own beacons and use a wormhole to
broadcast the same beacons at a location other than the
one where it actually is. We refer to this as teleport attack,
enabling the adversary to, e.g., deny liability in any accident
in which she is involved by beaconing at a distant, safe loca-
tion. The same discussion as for the phantom attack applies
here as well, and an integrated-antenna HSM is required
to prevent teleport attacks when the goal is determining
liability. Furthermore, A-VIP could be integrated with a
dedicated solution for countering wormholes (see, e.g., [9]).
Sybil attack. It consists in a single vehicle employing multi-
ple identities to corroborate its fake position advertisements.
Through a sybil attack, an adversarial user could avoid
broadcasting any beacon (i.e., perform a phantom attack),
yet have multiple impersonated vehicles reciprocally (though
falsely) report each other’s beacons. Sybil vehicles can thus
claim and mutually verify any possible position. However,
in our system, identities cannot be fabricated but they must
have been legitimately obtained, hence successively stolen
by the adversary. Such a hurdle makes the sybil attack often
infeasible, or only feasible for a short time before the identity
theft is discovered.
Still, if one wants to provide an additional defense against
sybil attacks, a practical solution would be to let the LA
accept reports only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) a vehicle sending the report has to exhibit at least a
symmetric link with another vehicle, i.e., vj has to report
a beacon from vi, which, in turn, reports a beacon from vj ;
(ii) a vehicle has to exhibit at least f different symmetric
links over any back-to-back reporting intervals: the higher
the f , the more the sybil identities required to successfully
mount the attack.
In order to meet the above two conditions, an attacker has
to transmit beacons, thus revealing its presence to others.
It follows that, through the reports of other vehicles, the
adversary may be detected.
Colluding attack. Colluders may only report each other’s
beacons, to corroborate their own false claims. The same
discussion as for sybil attacks applies here as well. Colluding
attackers have the further burden of continuous platooning
to be successful, which makes this attack impractical.
V. TESTBED RESULTS
In this section, we aim at acquiring a better understanding
of the position estimation provided by our framework. We
implemented the A-VIP protocol on real hardware and tested
it on up to five vehicles circulating on a 2-km loop on a
public road, with a single deployed RSU. In order to at
least alleviate the sparseness of the testbed scenario, we
had vehicles travel within each other’s range for most of
the time. Vehicles and RSU are equipped with an Alix PC
Engines motherboard and feature a IEEE 802.11h radio card.
Vehicles carry one 5 dBi omnidirectional antenna on their
rooftops, and transmit at an output power of 18 dBm. A GPS
receiver provides localization information to each vehicle.
The route traveled by the testbed vehicles is portrayed in
the left image of Fig. 3, except for an additional final loop
around the A point performed on a private road.
The propagation model, used for the computation of the
5probabilities p(j)i,s , is derived from experimental measure-
ments collected by the same vehicles used in the testbed.
The corresponding propagation map is depicted in the right
plot of Fig. 3, where, for clarity of presentation, the values
of the received signal power have been discretized into high,
medium and low signal quality bins.
In order to assess the quality of the position estimation in
our experimental testbed, we defined a metric called location
error, defined for a vehicle vi at time n as:
eni =
∑
s∈S
P (n)i,s d("
n
i , s) (3)
The location error is computed from the distances d("ni , s)
between the actual location of vi at time n, i.e., "ni , and
the centers of all tiles s. More precisely, such distances
are averaged using as a weight the probability P (n)i,s that
vi is within tile s at time n, inferred from reports coming
in from nearby vehicles as per (2). Interpolation is used if
some positions are unavailable.
Since all vehicles are correct in our testbed, the uncer-
tainty comes from (i) the RF signal propagation, which
is time-varying and may induce errors in the estimation
process, (ii) beacon and report message losses, impairing
the verification process at the LA, and (iii) the beacon
transmission frequency, which cannot capture the movement
of vehicles within the beaconing interval τb.
In fact, we found the first two sources of errors, i.e.,
the propagation variability and the packet losses, to have
a negligible impact on experimental results. It is instead the
latter aspect, i.e., the beacon periodicity, that affects A-VIP
operations in a more severe way. This is proven in Fig. 4,
portraying the location error computed as in (3), versus the
beaconing interval τb, with varying number of participating
vehicles. The error for τb = 1 s is in the order of the tile size
(set to 10 m in these tests) which is the maximum spatial
precision A-VIP can achieve. As the beaconing interval
increases, the error grows: cars are allowed to travel farther
between back-to-back beacon transmissions, forcing the LA
to estimate their intermediate locations with less data.
However, such an effect can be contrasted by a larger
set of vehicles taking part to A-VIP operations. The LA
then receives positioning information at a higher frequency,
since vehicles transmit beacons in a de-synchronized way
during τb and each beacon triggers reports by nearby cars.
Overall, the minor impact of physical layer phenomena on
A-VIP performance is a positive factor. Most of the problems
arise from the setting of τb; however, this is a tweakable
parameter, which our experimental evaluation suggests could
be dynamically set, according to road traffic density.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented A-VIP, a lightweight privacy-preserving
framework for verification and inference of vehicle positions
by a Location Authority. A-VIP leverages computationally-
inexpensive symmetric cryptography and reporting of
anonymized beacons by nearby vehicles. Through testbed
measurements, we have shown A-VIP to achieve its goals
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even in sparse vehicular settings with limited location error.
Future work will address the evaluation of trust for vehicles
involved in the cooperative location verification.
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